Detroit Water and Sewer

The Detroit Water and Sewer Department (DWSD) was the largest City Department in terms of revenues, expenditures and debt. It provided a necessary life-sustaining public service for the citizens of Detroit and Southeastern Michigan. The City of Detroit and its suburbs could not have existed without the water and sewer infrastructure and services provided by the DWSD. The Great Lakes contains the greatest amount of fresh water in the world. The Detroit Water and Sewer Systems were among the best in the world and were an engineering marvel. The DWSD provided water service to approximately four million people in Detroit and the neighboring Southeast Michigan communities. Most of the people, approximately 80% of those served by the DWSD, lived outside the City.

DWSD’s Water System supplied a 1,079-square-mile region serving approximately 40% of the State of Michigan’s population. The system’s water network consisted of 3,438 miles of transmission and distribution mains within Detroit and 403 miles of transmission mains in the remaining service areas.[1] Water service was provided to 126 wholesale suburban customers.

DWSD’s Sewage Disposal System (the “Sewer System”) covered a 946-square-mile area that encompassed 35 percent of Michigan’s population in Detroit and the neighboring suburban communities. The Sewer System consisted of ten pump stations, six combined sewer overflow (CSO) retention treatment basins (RTBs), three screening and disinfection facilities and a total of 3,433 miles of sewer lines that carried rainwater and wastewater to the Wastewater Treatment Plant.[2] Sewer services were provided to 76 wholesale suburban customers.[3]

The history of Detroit’s Water and Sewer Systems began in 1836, when the City purchased the “Water Works” from the Hydraulic Company. The Hydraulic Company was a private concern that owned the “Water Works” and had a contract with the City to provide water to its citizens. For the next century, Detroit thrived, growing and expanding into the region surrounding the City. The DWSD’s infrastructure grew along with it, serving as the backbone for regional expansion.[4]

Suburbanization in the Southeast Michigan region skyrocketed in the latter half of the twentieth century, largely in response to urban economic decline and growing racial tensions. Suburbanization or fragmentation in Southeast Michigan was the migration of White people from urban cities to more racially homogenous suburban cities — a trend that was deepened through federal and local government policies that incentivized different groups to move or stay in place.

Suburban development and urban infrastructure were closely tied. Development does not occur where water and sewerage services are unavailable. The ability to connect to Detroit’s existing water and sewerage plants allowed the suburbs to form. The suburban development took population and resources from the City of Detroit.

In the 1950s, when the population began to shift from urban to suburban areas, the role of DWSD in subsidizing suburban growth was contested. In 1954, L.H. Lenhardt, Director of the DWSD since 1936, expressed concern about further expanding the Water System and urged the suburbs to develop their own infrastructure. His successor, Gerald J. Remus, Director between 1955 and 1973, took the opposite stance. The Water System underwent a rapid expansion during Remus’s leadership and took on a great amount of debt to do so. In 1954, the City served 44 suburban wholesale customers. During Remus’s eighteen years as Director, 51 additional suburban municipalities were added, bringing the total to 96 in 1973.[5]

Mayor Cobo’s urban renewal projects in the 1950s were largely focused on blight removal and left Black residents in a greater housing crisis than before. One example of this practice in Detroit was the Gratiot housing project, a redevelopment project that left residents living in conditions as poor as in their previous neighborhoods.

In cities across the country, far greater numbers of affordable housing units were removed than rebuilt.

Urban renewal and blight removal policies evolved into redlined maps that codified racially inequitable development on paper and in practice.

Redlining which gets its name from the color of ink used to markup maps into “good” and “hazardous” investments referred to the practice of withholding mortgage lending from specific urban neighborhoods, and particularly from neighborhoods with high proportions of immigrants and people of color. These boundaries were drawn using highly subjective and prejudiced criteria but they made a lasting impact on the racial distribution of cities across the United States.

In 1939, a redlined map of Detroit indicated that 28 percent of the City was a “hazardous” investment, while 51 percent was “definitely declining.” Lenders only gave mortgage loans for homebuyers seeking to live in one-fifth of the City’s neighborhoods. In other words, banks decided only one-fifth of the City’s land was worthy of investment. By this time, any new water infrastructure funded by DWSD was outside the City. The banks considered Detroit a bad investment, and the DWSD followed suit.

By the late 1940s and with funding support from the Federal government, the construction of the

Davidson and Edsel Ford Expressways was underway. In Detroit, as in many other cities, expressways fragmented local neighborhoods in the City and created areas where residents were separated by race. The expressways enabled affluent White people to move to new homes in the suburbs.

Every suburban municipality in Detroit’s metropolitan region owed its existence to the DWSD’s expansion of infrastructure. Detroit used its credit and resources (both financial and human) to support the future growth of the entire region. Water and sewerage infrastructure were central to this growth. Detroit severely neglected long-overdue upgrades to its Water and Sewerage Systems. While Detroit’s systems languished, infrastructure was improved in the suburbs. The region’s storm and sanitary system was engineered, built, and paid for by DWSD. It did so in preference to the suburbs and in recognition of the growth potential in the region and it did so at the expense of essential upgrades to the outdated infrastructure system within the City of Detroit. Detroit “subsidized” the growth of its suburbs.

As you approach any City in the United States by air, you can tell exactly where the water and sewerage infrastructure ends. As you approach a City by car, all housing and development you see occurred only after the water and sewerage infrastructure was installed. When a City creates its Water and Sewer Systems, it is providing a foundation for all future growth. When a City allows infrastructure to crumble, communities are gutted.

Jobs moved to the suburbs, along with the mobile White population. Economic barriers, along with more discriminatory hiring and housing practices, prevented much of the Black population from leaving the urban center. In Detroit, population numbers plummeted and the job market shrank.[6]

The DWSD infrastructure in Detroit deteriorated over the years. Maintenance was deferred. Service was poor. From September 1987 when I bought my home on the Northeast side of Detroit, until May 2011 I never had any water leaking into my basement. In May 2011 after a heavy rainstorm, my wife called to tell me the basement was flooded with sewage. I left work and went home. There was several feet of water in my basement including sewage. My neighbors also experienced sewage in their basements at the time. We had extensive damage. My furnace was damaged. My tools, hot water heater, and dryer were destroyed. My wife’s artwork that she had created over 20 years was destroyed. I put together an inventory of what we lost and determined we lost around $12,000. I also had to pay for a dumpster to haul away the damage and for a restoration company to clean-up the mess. We were not insured for sewage back-ups. It was a costly nightmare.

Our neighborhood from 2011 to 2016 was hit three more times with sewage back-ups after heavy rains. I was spared on two occasions, but the last one in July 2016 got us but not so bad. I was able to clean it up myself and I did not sustain any major damage except for having the sewer drain clogged. Also, during this time, we would have water come through the basement walls during heavy rains or snows. It wasn’t much but was enough to be annoying.

Since we had no water or sewage back-ups from 1987 to 2011, I believed it was the deferred maintenance of the DWSD that contributed to the sewer back-ups and water backing into the basements. The City stopped street sweeping during the Archer administration. Later DWSD stopped or fell behind in cleaning the sewers. I believed the main sewers were plugged up with debris. The street next to our neighbor’s house would have a huge lake for days after a large rain or snow melt. We used to joke and call it Lake Sklar. That lake started appearing after the City deferred the maintenance on the sewers.

I know from my work with the City and after having attended meetings with the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA) and DWSD that they deferred maintenance on the Sewer System’s Infrastructure. They didn’t clean out the sewers and debris gathered in them over the years eventually causing blockages especially during heavy rains or snow. The lack of maintenance was due to cash flow problems and poor management prior to the bankruptcy.

I joined a class action lawsuit with other neighbors who were suing the DWSD for the sewer back-ups. The City’s bankruptcy in 2013 put a stay on our lawsuit. With the City’s bankruptcy our chances for any repayment of our claims was lost. We would have received pennies on the dollar and would have received the City’s worthless bonds which had a market value of 40% of their face value at the time. It wasn’t worth pursuing and the lawyers dropped the lawsuit. I tried to file a separate claim in the 36th District Court but the lawyers for DWSD came down hard on me and it wasn’t worth fighting so I dropped my claim.

I wasn’t happy with DWSD and the shabby way it treated its customers. After the bankruptcy and the fourth sewer back-up in the neighborhood, Gary Brown the DWSD Director, cleaned up the sewers in

July and August 2016. Surprisingly, Lake Sklar disappeared as water after heavy rainstorms drained properly off the street. We didn’t have the water backing up into our house. We had no more sewer back-ups while I lived there.

Still we had high water and sewer bills every month. The amount I paid a month was more than my parents paid every three months in Sterling Heights. I was paying three times the amount they were paying. The citizens of Detroit were charged a higher sewer rate than the suburban customers.

The City spent a fortune on the Combined Sewer Overflows (CSO) to comply with the Clean Water Act. The citizens of Detroit were assessed an unfair portion of these costs and were charged more for sewage disposal than any other community. A reason given was that the CSOs primarily benefited the Detroit citizens. The only benefit I saw since the CSOs were created was that we had more sewage back-ups in our basements after heavy rainfalls.

With all the corruption that went on in DWSD especially with the contracts during the time the CSOs were built it was likely the City was cheated on the CSOs. We were tired of paying for the CSOs and the sewage back-ups. We were tired of hearing DWSD explain that the sewage back-ups were due to engineering limitations, “Global Warming”, and basically that they couldn’t do anything about it.

I had a big concern about what the sewer back-ups were doing to my home: the damage done to my basement and foundation; and the potential for mold. I was concerned about what the impact of this was on the value of my home. Who wanted to buy a home when every time it rained heavily the sewer backed up? We spent many sleepless nights when it rained hard listening for the gurgling sound of sewage backing up into the basement.

The DWSD had a simple explanation for the last sewage back-up in July 2016 and initially blamed it on the heavier than normal rain and lack of capacity in the system to process the sewage. If it was lack of capacity why was there a huge gap between those south of Chalmers and us in Cornerstone village being impacted? My coworkers in East English Village, who were in the middle, were not affected. They should be on the same line. Some things DWSD was saying didn’t make sense other than to escape blame and liability for the sewer back-up.

Findings from an investigation into the July and August 2016 sewage back-ups commissioned by the DWSD cited a “lack of available pumps” during the rain storms that damaged hundreds of homes in several City neighborhoods.[7] DWSD Director Gary Brown said he was not surprised with the report, which noted the system inadequacies “significantly affected the number of basements experiencing back-ups.” The Department, he said, was working through $11 million in damage claims filed by about 800 customers from the two rainstorms.

“When you have large rain events, you need the pumps to be able to divert the water away from property that could be damaged,” he said. “With it not working, those are mitigating circumstances, which is why we’ve made the decision to settle with as many of these claims as we can.”

The summary from DWSD’s engineering report noted the Conner Creek Pumping Station, Freud Pumping Station and Conner Creek Combined Sewer Outfall facility served as the downstream outlet in storm events and their operation directly affected flooding in the Jefferson Chalmers area.[8] “It is expected that 14 out of 16 pumps would likely have been required during these rain events,” the November, 14, 2016 summary noted. “Only 6 pumps ran on July 8 and 7 pumps ran on August 16.”

I wanted to thank Mayor Duggan and Ron Brundidge, the Detroit Public Works Director for sending out garbage trucks on Sunday, July 10, 2016 to pick up the damaged property and sewage debris. In 2011 I had to obtain and pay for a trash dumpster to remove my sewer damaged goods. The DWSD later also paid my neighbors their damage claims for the July 2016 sewage back-up.

The escalating random shootings in the neighborhood and the threat of sewer back-ups every time it rained hard were good reasons to leave the City. Also, the high sewer rates were another reason for people to leave the City.

A Combined Sewer System (CSS) collects rainwater runoff, domestic sewage, and industrial wastewater into one pipe and are all transported to the same wastewater treatment plants. When the volume of wastewater exceeds the capacity of the system or the treatment plant, usually during wet weather events like heavy rainfall or snowmelt, combined sewer overflows (CSO) may result. This means that untreated or partially treated human and industrial waste, toxic materials, debris, and storm water discharges directly into streams, rivers, and other water bodies.[9] This causes public health and environmental quality issues.

State Environmental Protection Agencies (EPA), like Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), are tasked to regulate and track CSO events and issue permits. Each permit sets specific conditions that the system must conform with which is designed to ensure CSO events will not violate Clean Water Act standards. Despite this regulatory system, there is a nationwide problem with the capacity of CSS systems to make adequate upgrades to meet water quality standards. This is, in part, due to a lack of Federal spending (i.e., unfunded mandate) on drinking and wastewater infrastructure that could supplement state and local government spending.

The objective of the Clean Water Act (CWA) was to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. Section 301 of the CWA makes the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters unlawful, unless such discharge is authorized by permit.

On May 6, 1977, the United States EPA initiated a case against the State of Michigan, the City, and the DWSD because the Detroit wastewater treatment plant’s (WTTP) effluent discharge exceeded the amount permitted by its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit (NPDES). NPDES permitting regulations were implemented in 1972 under the CWA. The EPA also alleged that: “the number of personnel employed [at the WWTP] has not been sufficient, personnel are not adequately trained, and purchasing of necessary and required supplies and equipment has not been timely or at an acceptable level . . .”.

While many public systems found themselves struggling to meet newly imposed federal regulations, Detroit’s case was unusual in that the process to create a mutually agreeable compliance schedule between EPA and DWSD was protracted over 37 years, during which DWSD was “overseen” by Federal Judge, John Feikens for most of that time. Over the course of the 37-year EPA suit, DWSD management submitted multiple strategic plans aimed at bringing the DWSD system into compliance with the CWA. Detroit was not alone in finding itself falling short of compliance. A consistent problem that left DWSD and other utility providers under court jurisdiction was the long-term feasibility of plans to resolve water quality issues, and in particular, the availability of sufficient financial resources to enact corrective plans.[10]

The structural flaw of beneficial environmental legislation in the 1970s, including the CWA, was inadequate federal investment to support local utilities’ efforts to meet the new standards. Ultimately, this created the need for the utility to borrow and create rate structures predicated on cost-recovery and not affordability. Thus, during that period, the DWSD experienced increasing financial stress as revenue bonds were taken on in attempts to fund and bring the DWSD into compliance with the CWA.

Infrastructure to reduce CSO events is costly. Combined sewer systems can no longer be built and cities with CSO systems often try to convert to sanitary sewers or reduce the likelihood of CSO events through green or grey infrastructure projects. Grey CSO management infrastructure includes filtering contaminated overflow or relieving pressure on the system by way of large retention basins. Green infrastructure draws from nature to divert and reduce storm water flowing into a sewer system and water supply. While green infrastructure projects are a promising strategy to reduce CSO events, cities under compliance schedules with the EPA can be locked into traditional grey infrastructure projects. Detroit rate payers’ were charged 83 percent of the costs of several CSO facilities leased by the regional system, while the wholesale customers were charged only 17 percent.

The MDEQ mandated that the City invest in CSO control infrastructure in the 1990s, which cost approximately $1 billion. The estimated total cost of CSO infrastructure needed for Detroit was $7.0 billion and much of it was not completed or even started.[11]

During Judge Feikens’ oversight, he signed an agreement in 1999 (1999 Rate Settlement Agreement) requiring Detroit ratepayers to pay for 83 percent of combined sewerage improvements, leaving the suburban wholesale customers responsible for only 17 percent. There was little technical data to support this disproportional agreement. The basis for the disparity was that the City had a greater share of the CSO control infrastructure costs and benefits. The agreement subsequently led to hugely inflated sewerage costs for Detroit’s customers. There was also frustration for Detroiters that the rationale of the 83/17 split was not clear leaving the cost allocation to seem arbitrary and unfair.[12]

The DWSD’s Detroit customers bear a large burden for sewerage costs in the region. The FY 2015–16 GLWA Budget for sewerage expenditures included $254.6 million or 48.1% for Detroit of the total of $529.8 million. While the cost charges to Detroit were 48.1%, the billable volumes of sewage in thousands of cubic feet to the City were 17.7% (3,025,000/17,061,200) for FY 2016, per the Plante & Moran Financial forecast for the GLWA.[13] There appeared to be an unfair allocation of sewerage charges to the City of Detroit based on this data.[14]

GLWA held a meeting with City of Detroit and suburban wholesale customers on the allocation of CSO costs on January 14, 2016. The CSO meeting was prompted by questions from the DWSD CFO and the City of Dearborn. The meeting dealt with the history of the negotiations for the rate settlements and the final rate settlement agreement.

Prior to 1999, sewerage disposal costs between the City and its customers were shared based on annual volume. The model split costs 61% suburban to 39% Detroit. This was based on a 1977 plan when Detroit’s population was 1.2 million and had a greater percentage of the service area of the Sewer System.

The counties sued in 1992 over the sewage rates charged. They said the CSOs were Detroit facilities and they should not have to pay. Their logic was that since Detroit had the majority of treatment facilities it should pay the majority of the CSO capital costs. Detroit’s position was that everyone benefitted as the suburb sewage flows went through the City’s system. The City and suburbs negotiated to resolve the share of the CSO cost issue. The allocation of the CSO capital costs was based on where the waste was treated and where the overflow facilities were located. The DWSD and its suburban customers agreed to split the costs 83/17 with Detroit bearing the higher percentage. The agreement was made on June 18, 1999. This may not have been the best basis for allocation, but it was accepted between the negotiating parties. The Federal Court approved the Settlement agreement.

The original view of the CSO service was called the Single System Concept. It said the region was like a bathtub and all users were responsible. This changed over time. Judge Feikens promoted the original concept. He wanted all customers to pay the same rate. However, this was not politically feasible. The plan went through five iterations. The last view was called the Modified bathtub approach where the capital costs would be allocated based on where the sewage was treated.

A person who worked on the development of the CSO plan, said that Don Trim (Wade Trim & Sverdrup/Wade Trim) was a facilitator that deserved great credit for the settlement of the 83/17 split. He said it was a “significant achievement”. Note that Trim was a partner of Wade/Trim and also was involved with Sverdrup/Wade Trim partnership which had over $500 million in contracts with DWSD at the time. These contracts included the development of the CSOs. Was this a conflict of interest?[15]

Another speaker from Wayne County said the question on the CSOs was affordability. The City could not afford them. He said if the split had been determined to be 50/50, the suburbs would not have approved the contracts for the CSOs. Since Detroit bore the larger portion of the CSO cost he said it was on them [Detroit] because they would have to pay it and the suburbs didn’t object to the CSOs. Essentially the suburbs were protected from having to pay the CSO costs.[16]

The GLWA Director, Sue McCormick said in 2016 that GLWA was starting to work on the Waste Water Master Plan. The Rate Settlement Agreement of 1999 was an Order of the Court. Judge Cox, Feiken’s successor, reviewed all settlements. Some were no longer applicable or relevant. Some such as the CSO 1999 Rate Settlement Agreement were considered survivors. Judge Cox determined these were still valid and they were incorporated into the new contracts with the suburban customers. If the CSO split was to be changed it would have to be done through the contract negotiation process. Also, the Waste Water Master Plan would need to provide the data and support for any change in the 83/17 CSO split.[17]

Contributing to the decline in the DWSD net assets was the Sewage Disposal Fund’s recording of a special item (loss) during the year ended June 30, 2008 to recognize an impairment loss of $142.0 million due to the City’s decision to suspend the Detroit River Outflow Construction Project (CSO control facility). The outflow project, which involved deep tunneling, was initiated in 1999 and included construction of an entrance and access shaft, and six diffuser riser shafts in the Detroit River as required by an operating permit issued by the MDEQ. The project was suspended due to flooding of the initial outflow tunnel.

During and after his appointment as the DWSD Special Administrator, Mayor Kilpatrick and DWSD Director Victor Mercado were charged with extorting and rigging municipal contracts. The majority of the contracts alleged in the indictment were contracts paid for by the DWSD.[18] In 2014, Mercado was convicted of colluding with Mayor Kilpatrick to illegally rig $70 million worth of DWSD contracts for Bobby Ferguson.

The Kilpatrick Administration overcharged the DWSD for property sales, collections of water bills, the use of the 800 megahertz radio system and other services provided by the City. It was purposely done to divert DWSD revenue to the City’s General Fund.

Property for DWSD’s use as CSO control facilities such as the Blain and Revere parcels were sold by the City for $17.7 million and $5 million respectively in 2008.[19] The DWSD disputed the Revere parcel and never paid for it and the land reverted back to the City in 2013. The cost of the Blain parcel was based on the price the City paid for it when it was acquiring riverfront land for the Casinos. The City initiated condemnation proceedings for the Blain parcel in 2000 by filing a lawsuit against its owner, Detroit Plaza Limited Partnership. The City had the property appraised and offered what it deemed to be fair market value of $14,000,000. The owner rejected the City’s appraisal and demanded substantially more money.

After extensive litigation, the Court ordered the City to pay $25.0 million for the Blain property. The City appealed the ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling in 2006. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the City’s appeal in June 2007. In addition to the amount of court judgment, the Detroit Plaza Limited Partnership was entitled to interest on the judgment from the date the lawsuit was filed to the conclusion of the lawsuit. The City paid Detroit Plaza Limited Partnership $34.1 million for the property including $25 million for the judgement, $5.1 million for attorney costs and $4.0 million interest.

DWSD’s share was based on the 3.7 acres or 51.9% of the 7.129 acres of the property acquired and 51.9% of the City’s acquisition cost. At the time the property was not worth $34.1 million and DWSD was greatly overcharged for its portion. On June 18, 2008, the BOWC approved the acquisition of the Blain parcel for the CSO for the $17.7 million.[20]

The City of Detroit charged a 15% administrative fee to DWSD for water and sewer collections via the property tax bill and County Revolving Fund for tax years 2007‑2009. The City collected $21.4 million during this time and took $3.2 million for the administration fee. The 15% fee was high, which the DWSD was not happy with.[21]

On the other hand DWSD often billed the City for water and sewer services that were questionable. The PLD had issues with DWSD’s billings.[22] The PLD accountant told us, “The big issues is back in 2000 and 2001 we started getting monthly sewerage bills in the $1 million range where previously they were $100,000 or less. DWSD made some adjustments but refused to provide us with detail.”

The PLD accountant also told us, “PLD is seriously behind in our DWSD payments. A good part of the problem is I believe a number of the bills are overstated, primarily for two reasons. One, several locations have been getting estimated bills for months estimated at up to 100 cubic feet (748 gallons) per day. These are unmanned substations and should have nominal usage. Second, the drainage charges for multiple locations are for more square footage than our records show we own.”[23]

The DWSD financial condition was poor before the bankruptcy. On June 30, 2012 the DWSD had a combined $1.1 billion unrestricted deficit combined for both the Water and Sewer Funds. The revenue bond swaps did contribute to the DWSD losses over fiscal years 2010–2012 as the change in the value of the swap liability grew significantly. DWSD issued bonds in 2012 and used the proceeds to terminate $537 million of swaps in FY 2012 (swap termination fees).[24] Besides the $537 million of swap termination fees, DWSD’s operating losses included $449 million of project construction and/or equipment costs incurred but abandoned. These expenses were permanently fixed in the DWSD long-term debt and were costs to be repaid by all ratepayers in their future water and sewer charges.

Included in the DWSD FY 2013 operating losses were additional write-offs of $65.4 million in construction projects abandoned, bringing the total to $514.4 million in construction costs incurred but abandoned. The consistent abandonment of investments in capital projects was troubling.[25]

In the FY 2014 CAFR, DWSD had a $209.2 million negative Investment in Capital Assets which was highly unusual. The “Net Investment in Capital Assets” figure represents the amount invested in capital assets, net of outstanding debt. After incurring over $6 billion in debt to fund capital improvements and infrastructure you would expect that they would have had a large positive investment in capital assets. DWSD representatives told us that asset write offs and swap termination fees contributed to this. They said the two major contributing factors resulting in the negative balance for FY 2014 were: (1) DWSD issued over $500 million in debt to terminate “swap” agreements during FY 2012 (There were no capital assets associated with this debt); and (2) DWSD terminated several capital projects over the past ten years (there were no capital assets associated with this debt). This represented the poor management of DWSD which also led to the fraud and waste over the years while the Federal Judges had oversight.

The debt service expense on revenue bonds, swap losses, corruption, project abandonment, City overcharges, depreciation, Sterling Heights Tunnel Fiasco all contributed to the DWSD losses as the rates charged to customers were not sufficient to pay for all these losses. Environmental compliance and infrastructure investments along with the corruption and mismanagement created a huge debt for DWSD.[26] The DWSD would have needed huge rate increases to pay off the debt.

In 2012, over 40 percent of DWSD’s revenue (i.e. customer’s payments) was going towards debt service.[27]

During the bankruptcy, in October 2013, Miller Buckfire and Conway MacKenzie reported DWSD wholesale and retail operations capital needs of $2.5 billion.[28]

Mayor Bing appointed a new BOWC on April 1, 2011. The Board’s authority to effectuate needed changes to achieve compliance with the CWA was shaped by a series of subsequent federal court orders.[29] On September 9, 2011, the Root Cause Committee was created.

In a September 2011 Opinion & Court Order Federal Judge Sean F. Cox described the history of ongoing institutional and bureaucratic barriers to compliance with the Clean Water Act. Judge Cox stated, “It is undisputed that, over the course of the past 34 years, the DWSD has had serious and recurring permit violations — which constitute violations of the Clean Water Act. The Court finds that the DWSD’s violations of its NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act are serious and continuing and present a serious health, safety and environmental risk to the people of Southeastern Michigan.” Note the judge said the people of Southeastern Michigan. He didn’t say Detroit. Should the cost to comply, especially the CSO cost, be shared by all not just Detroit?

Barriers included provisions of the City’s Charter, ordinances, and contracts. Judge Cox noted that the Federal Court possessed broad equitable powers to order any relief necessary to achieve compliance and was not constrained by the provisions of the City’s Charter or ordinances. Rather than exercising Federal authority, however, Judge Cox sought solutions devised by City of Detroit local officials.[30]

Accordingly he ordered the Mayor of the City of Detroit, the City Council President, City Council President Pro Tem, and a member of the BOWC to meet, confer, and devise a plan to address the root causes of noncompliance. This coalition came to be known as the Root Cause Committee (RCC). In performing the analysis, the Court ordered that these individuals “shall not be constrained by any local Charter or ordinance provisions or by the provisions of union or other contracts.”

The Court ordered numerous actions to achieve long term compliance. In short, the Court Order provided that DWSD should have operational independence in the areas of law, finance, human resources and procurement without ordering legal independence for DWSD.

The challenge noted by the RCC was for DWSD to remain a Department of the City of Detroit while being granted sufficient authority to overcome the barriers to noncompliance. The resolution was that final approval authority vested in the Director of DWSD as authorized by the BOWC without any further approvals from other Departments, boards, agencies, or offices of the City of Detroit.

The State law, M.C.L. § 117.5e, provided that a municipal water or sewage system which served more than 40% of the population of the State, needed approval of the governing body (i.e., City Council) to implement a rate increase. Judge Cox determined that, “This Court has not been provided with evidence to establish whether or not the DWSD currently serves more than 40% of Michigan’s population. If it no longer serves more than 40% of Michigan’s population, then M.C.L. § 117.5e does not require the Detroit City Council to approve rates charged by the DWSD.” The DWSD has used this among other reasons as the basis for not seeking City’s Council’s approval for the rates it charges its Detroit customers.

Judge Cox said that “although it was ordering rather significant structural changes to the DWSD, the changes ordered by this Court “do not structure the DWSD as a separate entity.” That is, the structural changes ordered by this Court did not alter the fact that the DWSD, and all of the assets of the DWSD, are owned by the City of Detroit.”[31]

In March 2013, the RCC submitted a final plan proposing a new operational model for DWSD that centered on the creation of a regional authority to operate and manage DWSD.[32] The Judge acknowledged the proposal would entail the Court ordering the creation of two regional authorities. Under the proposal, the City of Detroit would transfer all of the DWSD’s assets to the first such proposed authority that would, in turn, enter into a lease agreement with a second newly created authority. That second authority would then make annual PILOT payments to the City of Detroit. Without providing any financial analysis, the RCC asserted that the proposed PILOT payments to the City could be up to $70 million per year.[33]

Judge Cox said “this Court’s jurisdiction over this case is limited to taking those actions necessary to enable the DWSD to achieve substantial compliance with its NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act. This Court has no intention of ordering the creation of a regional authority and has no intention of ordering or approving the transfer of the DWSD’s assets to a regional authority.”

Judge Cox said that “If the City of Detroit and/or its regional customer communities wish to pursue the creation of a regional authority, they may do so through the political/legislative process. This Court’s orders do not prevent the City of Detroit from selling or leasing the DWSD’s assets and thus do not prevent exploration of this concept in the appropriate arena. This Court is not the appropriate arena.”

Judge Cox said, “Arguably, if the Court were to order or approve the transfer of one of the City of Detroit’s largest assets, at this juncture, that could potentially force the City into bankruptcy or have other highly undesirable consequences.”

It was interesting the Court advocated for a regional authority at the time the Emergency Manager was appointed. It was apparent looking back that the Governor and others were seriously looking at putting Detroit through bankruptcy at that time. Judge Cox also seemed to be on board with the bankruptcy and regionalization of the DWSD.

On March 27, 2013, Judge Cox issued the Court Opinion and Order ending the 1977 lawsuit between the EPA and DWSD. In the case’s closing proceedings in March 2013, Cox found the RCC’s submissions adequate to end the suit, deeming the 2011 administrative consent order a “sufficient mechanism to ensure sustained, compliance” with Federal environmental regulations.

Judge Cox said:

“The Court concludes that, after more than thirty-five years of federal court oversight, the DWSD has achieved substantial compliance with its NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act. This Court shall therefore terminate the Second Amended Consent Judgment and close this case because the existing ACO [Administrative Consent Order] is a sufficient mechanism to address any future issues regarding compliance with the DWSD’s NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act.”[34]

The CWA case was finally closed, and the Water and Sewer Systems would have been returned to the City had EM Kevyn Orr not taken over two weeks prior.[35]

DWSD’s Detroit customers saw large water and sewer rate increases over the past 20 years. Detroit residents have a greater level of poverty than the suburban residents served by GLWA, which limits their ability to pay for water and sewer services. The unfunded mandates like the Federal CWA and the State of Michigan’s “Lead & Copper Rule”, will further drive up rates. Sewer and drainage rates for Detroit customers already exceeded those charged to residents of the suburbs because of the unfair allocation of costs to City residents. Detroit customers, especially those in poverty, needed relief from high water, sewer and drainage rates. The GLWA needed to take into consideration the ability to pay when setting water and sewer rates. The State and Federal governments needed to consider the ability to pay when passing laws and requirements, which were unfunded mandates.

During the City of Detroit bankruptcy negotiations the possibility of regionalization of the Water and Sewer Systems re-emerged. The transferring of water and sewerage utilities to quasi-governmental authorities or private entities was a national trend — one that followed an even longer practice internationally. In 2011, for example, Pontiac, Michigan signed a service agreement which transferred management of their water system to United Water, a subsidiary of the global water firm Suez. Similar institutional restructuring of public water and sewer systems occurred in many places, including Montana, Indiana, Arizona, and Kentucky.

During the bankruptcy negotiations, Detroit’s emergency management, decided that the DWSD would be regionalized into a regional water authority. The creation of the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA) and the service and lease agreements were politically expedient solutions made possible by the bankruptcy. In the beginning the City was negotiating for a lease payment that would benefit the City’s General Fund. The suburban negotiators objected to any of the lease payment going to the City’s General Fund and prevailed.

On April 7, 2014 EM Kevyn Orr put out a Request for Information for private contractors interested in managing the system. While Orr was receiving bids for privatizing the system (leasing or selling), he was also at the same time negotiating with suburban representatives about regionalizing DWSD under a new regional authority.

It was argued that DWSD should not have been included in the bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy law governing municipal bankruptcy, unlike corporate bankruptcy, does not involve the liquidation of municipal assets to settle debts. The regionalization of Detroit’s water and sewer systems was not intended to provide creditors with payments. It was done to take away control of the systems from the City with the belief that the customers would be better served by a regional system. The bankruptcy benefitted the region’s customers by cutting DWSD’s pension and retiree health care obligations.

DWSD’s debt was included in the calculation of Detroit’s total municipal debt to drive it up and justify the bankruptcy filing. Detroit was only a fraction of the DWSD’s service area, but its debt was attributed to Detroit alone for bankruptcy purposes. In his 2013 analysis of the calculation of Detroit’s municipal debt, Wallace Turbeville wrote:

“Additional $5.8 billion is debt [that is] owed from the Water and Sewerage Department, which serves in excess of three million people all across southeastern Michigan (roughly 40 percent of the state’s population). The debt is payable from the fees charged for that service rather than from city resources. This is debt of an enterprise that reaches far beyond the city and is not a direct obligation of the city’s budget. Thus, asserting that the total bond amount is a liability of the city is not appropriate.”[36]

The City and the suburbs came to an agreement in 2014 to regionalize DWSD and the GLWA was created. The agreement, finalized in 2015, required that Detroit manage and maintain its municipal water system under a new, limited entity: DWSD Retail (DWSD-R).[37]

A goal of the EM and GLWA was to restrict water and sewer rate increases to no more than 4% per year for the first 10 years.[38] Considering the amount of debt GLWA carried and other operating requirements the 4% rate cap was too low.

GLWA operates and manages the main Water and Sewer Systems and facilities within Detroit’s municipal boundaries. DWSD continues to operate and manage the remaining ‘parts’ the system within its municipal borders. The ‘parts’ of the system were defined and itemized in the lease and services agreements and subsequent DWSD and GLWA documents. DWSD was to be another wholesale customer of GLWA although it is situated differently than other wholesale customers. Suburban customers — not users who live in suburbs, but the suburbs themselves — are “wholesale customers” of GLWA, rather than being wholesale customers of DWSD as was the case under the prebankruptcy arrangement. Suburban municipalities purchase water and sewerage services at a wholesale rate and sell it to suburban residents with a retail markup. As DWSD used to do, GLWA sells water to suburban municipalities at a price that strictly covers the cost-of-service. The suburbs then add a retail price when selling to residents to cover their own costs. Each suburb sets its own markup and keeps its own revenue.

GLWA assumed responsibility for DWSD’s bonded indebtedness and committed to putting $42.9 million dollars towards DWSD pensions over eight years.[39]

GLWA leases the regional water and sewerage infrastructure from Detroit for $50 million per year for 40 years. The lease funds are set aside in an account managed by GLWA. In addition, GLWA commits $4.5 million or .5 percent of based budgeted operating revenues for a water assistance program. Furthermore, as a “return on equity,” GLWA provides an annual $26.2 million credit to revenues Detroit is required to collect under the agreements.

Prior to the bankruptcy, the DWSD received from the wholesale customers a ‘rate of return’ subsidy (estimated at $29 million annually) that was designed to compensate the City for its ownership of the DWSD system and for risks and rewards of its management.

The $50 million annual lease payment, of which approximately $13.6 million comes from Detroit rate payers, is considered a “common-to-all” cost. The lease revenue use is restricted per an agreement with GLWA to maintain DWSD’s water and sewerage infrastructure, to pay debt services associated with those improvements, or to contribute to the common-to-all improvements in the system. The City of Detroit cannot use any of the $50 million for its General Fund, which lessens the value of the lease to the City.

Under the lease and shared services agreements, some costs of operating and improving the regional system are considered “common-to-all,” meaning that DWSD and other wholesale customers contribute to them. The cost allocation methodology unfairly burdens Detroit ratepayers with higher sewer costs. These unfair cost allocation practices perpetuate regional inequities and leave less funding for repair and improvement of the infrastructure that is within the City’s borders.[40]

Some analysts believe the $50 million annual lease payment was low, especially when Detroit rate payers were paying $13.6 million of it. The Root Cause Committee estimated the annual lease payment could be $70 million. In FY 2018 GLWA reported $811.9 million of revenue for both the water and sewer systems. A good profit margin for utilities is 8% to 10%. A good lease at 10% of annual revenues would yield $81.2 million.

Some would say Detroit got a good deal because the Water and Sewer Systems have a negative net position (i.e., equity) as of June 30, 2018 due to the high debt burden and rates are restricted to a 4% cap, which reduces their market and lease value.

The 4% rate cap restriction limits the ability of GLWA and DWSD to generate revenue to cover their operating costs let alone make necessary improvements to the systems. On June 30, 2018, GLWA had a $903.7 million unrestricted deficit and a negative net position of $178.8 million which indicates it is insolvent and will need substantial rate increases. The FY 2018 CAFR documented that GLWA had a $75.9 million negative change in net position (revenues less expenses). The FY 2017 CAFR documented that GLWA had an $88.2 million negative change in net position. These negative changes in net position of GLWA indicates that the 4% rate cap is too low to generate sufficient revenue to cover costs. The DWSD and other GLWA customers will ultimately have to charge its customers higher rates in the future to make up for the deficits that GLWA has racked up over the past two years and any in the future. The benefits of the lease payment to DWSD and its customers will be offset by the higher rates.

The DWSD is essentially using the GLWA lease payment to keep its rate increases to its Detroit customers lower than the 4% cap. The FY 2018 Detroit CAFR reports a $527.6 million net position and $707.6 million net position for the DWSD water and sewage disposal funds, respectively. This along with rate increases that are lower than 4% indicate the DWSD is in a good financial condition. This is misleading as the present value of the 40 years of lease payments which are $464.1 million and $584.8 million for the DWSD water and sewage disposal funds, respectively are included in the net position. The future lease payments provide no benefit to DWSD until received. The use of the lease payments are restricted. When received they will go right back to GLWA to pay for DWSD’s share of the debt and deficit. It is also likely that the City’s General Fund will have to subsidize DWSD in the future just like it does the transportation system to ensure citizens receive basic water and sewer services.

Due to the absence of necessary investment and improvement over the years, the Water and Sewer Systems’ infrastructure serving Detroit are in great need of repair and upgrade. The DWSD will be required to make major capital and repair expenditures now and long into the future.

Financing costly and vital updates to older infrastructure is not just a problem for the City of Detroit.

There are many other suburban municipalities that are struggling with development and aging infrastructure — including water and sewer infrastructure. Many of these municipalities have lower tax bases and higher concentration of residents living in poverty. Just like Detroit, they will be faced with the flight of wealthier citizens to other cities, resulting in lower tax base and revenues, blight, higher legacy costs including infrastructure and annual deficits.[41]

While the City of Detroit has experienced a large decline in population, the regional area has not. Mitigating the harm of CSO events is not only in the interest of the people living in the immediate area of the discharge into surface waters it benefits everyone in the region. The environmental principle “we are all downstream” is well suited to this problem. Ensuring surface water quality is a service provided not only to Detroiters or communities with combined sewers, but is a service provided to the entire service area and many more. Compliance with the CWA benefits all who have the Detroit River as their source of drinking water. Maintaining water quality within the Great Lakes Water Basin contributes to the quality of 20 percent of the globe’s fresh surface water. Water security and its impacts on environmental quality and public health are universally beneficial.[42]

Judge Cox said in March 2013, “The Court finds that the DWSD’s violations of its NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act are serious and continuing and present a serious health, safety and environmental risk to the people of Southeastern Michigan.”[43] He didn’t just include the City of Detroit. He said Southeastern Michigan. The intention of the costs incurred by DWSD to comply with the CWA was to benefit all in Southeastern Michigan and not just Detroit. The costs should be equitably shared by the entire Southeastern Michigan region.

There is a need to establish a more equitable sewer cost-sharing model that takes regional inequities such as cities with high poverty rates into account. Not requiring Detroit ratepayers to contribute to the $50 million annual lease payment would be a good start. A recognition of the regional benefit of compliance with the CWA and the equitable sharing of those costs especially for the CSO infrastructure would greatly contribute to equity among the regions ratepayers. Water affordability, specifically sewerage disposal service affordability, needs to be assessed and addressed especially when one group of rate payers who can least afford it are charged more than any other group.[44]

“Legacy Cities” refer to older industrial cities that have steadily lost population and jobs since the 1950s or 1960s. On the whole, these cities have increased rates of poverty, among other effects, and show signs of economic distress. A key challenge of population decline is a decrease in a City’s revenues, while the costs of City services rise.[45]

Water and sewer utilities serving cities with declining populations have the challenge of a decreasing numbers of ratepayers, which causes decreased utility revenues and therefore increases the costs to remaining ratepayers to maintain existing infrastructure designed to support larger populations.[46] The City of Detroit’s water and sewer infrastructure in the 1940s had the capacity to serve 2 million people in the City. The costs for that infrastructure now resides with the 600,000 remaining, most of which have lower incomes when adjusted for inflation than those living in the City in the 1940s. Those who can pay, pay for those who can’t.

The Detroit bankruptcy fell short in helping the poverty stricken residents of the City. The restructuring of City’s finances and assets during the bankruptcy proceedings could have offered an equitable path forward that allowed for the fair distribution of power and resources in the region. The Governor, EM, Bankruptcy Judges and Michigan’s elite were more focused on saving the art museum and other Detroit assets for regional use and absolving the State from its pension and other obligations to the City. Unfortunately, the root cause for Detroit’s financial failure, and education, blight, crime and other problems, was never solved let alone even identified. The root cause was the extreme poverty of a large amount of the City’s residents resulting in a low tax base and less tax revenue and the inequitable distribution of public services in the region. Many, unless blinded by racism, would say it was a problem beyond their ability to solve. Yet not solving the problem, resulted in the bankruptcy as being just another way to provide short term relief and kick the can down the road.

Without providing equitable education, public safety and other necessary services, Detroit’s residents don’t stand a chance. Their poverty and misery will be passed on from generation to generation as it has been since the 1960s. The City will always have fiscal problems unless the poverty is driven out. The fear is that it will be driven out by gentrification — the pushing out of the impoverished into the suburbs or elsewhere. This will be just moving the problem to another location. An honorable and just society calls for the root cause of the poverty to be addressed through a more equitable distribution of public education, public safety and other services that ensures those in most need have an equitable chance.[47] Charging impoverished rate payers more for water and sewer services is not honorable nor just.

Detroit is the backbone of the region with housing, highways, universities, hospitals, museums, and governmental buildings that are used by people throughout Southeast Michigan. Much of the drainage entering the system and contributing to CSOs is related to the large impervious services required for those facilities. The costs pertaining to other entities that serve the region but are located in Detroit, such as the wastewater treatment plants are common-to-all; this ought to be the case for CSO costs as well.[48]

A good example is the State of Michigan does not pay its fair share of drainage costs for the State roads in Detroit. As a result, their costs are passed on to Detroit rate payers.

The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), was billed drainage fees for State highways located in the City, and had an estimated balance due of $2.8 million in 2019. MDOT disputed the amount of their monthly bills, and was paying about one-half of the billed amount for the last two years. DWSD was in discussions with the Attorney General regarding potential litigation, and these negotiations were ongoing for almost two years. MDOT received a drastic reduction in the monthly amount they were charged per impervious acre ($93 per impervious acre versus $598 for others), and yet they were paying only about one-half of that amount billed. The dispute appeared to be over the total acres billed. A consent judgment from 1990 provided that MDOT would be charged for 714 acres but DWSD was charging them for 2,094 acres.[49]

Detroit customers pay the highest sewerage and drainage rates in the region. The consequences of the inequitable allocation of costs under the agreement with GLWA are detrimental to the wellbeing of DWSD and the fiscal wellbeing of Detroit.[50] High taxes, insurance premiums, and sewerage rates keep Detroit from attracting new residents.

The Lincoln Institute measured revenues from 112 cities in its Fiscally Standardized Cities database for 2012, which uses fiscal data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Per capita sewer fees, increased by 16 percent across the 112 cities in the database. The average sewer charge was $221; residents in Detroit averaged $728 per capita and Seattle averaged $662 per capita. Detroiters paid more than three times the average. Growing fees were one reason Detroit residents couldn’t afford their water and sewerage bills. San Francisco was $391 per capita.[51]

Given the likelihood of increased regulatory issues with the regional water and sewer infrastructure, capital needs and continuing GLWA deficits it is probable that rates will increase beyond the annual four percent cap currently in place, which will adversely impact affordability in low-income communities.

Detroit’s water shutoffs have been widespread and have raised the visibility of water affordability problems across the country. In Detroit, at least 100,000 households have had their water shut off since 2014. While the annual number of shutoffs has decreased since 2014, in March 2018, the Detroit Free Press reported that at least 17,000 households were at risk for shutoffs. Data suggests that in Detroit, as in other places across the country experiencing water shutoffs there is not a reticence to pay, but rather the problem is being unable to pay.[52]

According to a 2015 study, prices for water and sewer maintenance continued to rise at a much higher rate than the overall rate of inflation, in contrast to price trends for other utilities, including electricity, natural gas, and telecommunications, that are tracking at or below the rate of inflation.[53]

The 4% cap on rate increases expires in 2025 per the GLWA agreement. Significant “affordability” concerns remain, especially whether Detroit rate payers will be able to pay for GLWA’s new infrastructure, debt and operating deficits.[54] I believe that water and sewer rates in the not too distant future will be outrageous and unaffordable, especially for City residents. Eventually everyone will be fed up and something will have to be done.[55] DWSD has to continue advocating for more equitable sewage and drainage rates for its customers.

At the time of this writing there is a governance issue over DWSD. The City Council’s position was that per the City Charter the City Council was responsible for approving the rates set for Detroit customers by the DWSD and for approving the DWSD budget. DWSD’s position was that approval of rates by Council was not specifically set out in the City Charter or in State Law. The DWSD and its BOWC contend that the BOWC had the approval authority over the rates set by DWSD and the annual budget.

Judge Cox ordered that the City Council had no authority over DWSD. Since the Judge’s order was in March 2013 before the bankruptcy and the creation of GLWA which effectively resolved the issues of non-compliance with the Clean Water Act it should not have applied to the new DWSD which could not impact the setting of rates or budgets for GLWA and its customers. The City Council has not been able to establish control over the City’s largest Department in terms of revenues and expenditures for the budget and the rates it charges its citizens. This is egregious and a disenfranchisement of Detroit citizens. If this was the Judge’s intention than he overstepped his bounds by essentially interfering in the democratic process of the City of Detroit.

The DWSD Director, Gary Brown, wrote in an e-mail, “DWSD will not seek City Council approval of FY2019 rates or the FY2019 and FY2020 amended budgets as it is not required to do so. Pursuant to Sec. 7–1202 of the 2012 Detroit City Charter, the Board of Water Commissioners directs the DWSD in the supply of water drainage and sewerage services within the City and establishes the rates to be paid by the owner or occupant of each house or building using water, drainage or sewerage services. Judge Sean Cox’s December 15, 2015 Order[56] (entered in anticipation of the bifurcation of DWSD into a separate regional wholesale system and a Detroit retail operation) reiterated the powers granted to the BOWC under Article 7, Chapter 12.”[57]

Brown added, “While this response is not intended to be a formal statement of DWSD’s legal position, absent a federal court order or a super-majority vote of an Ad Hoc Root Cause Committee to do so, DWSD will not seek City Council approval for rates or budgets; rather, it will continue to make informational presentations.”

Brown and DWSD’s interpretation of the Judge’s order was outrageous. How could they continue the requirements for the regional system for the new DWSD? Not only did the bankruptcy take away the City’s control over Water and Sewer for the region it also took away the control over the local part that exclusively served the City. No other municipal customer of GLWA had such an arrangement.

The State of Michigan in response to the lead poisoning in the Flint Water crisis issued an unfunded mandate, the “Lead and Copper Rule”, which will require local governments to replace the lead water service lines leading into the ratepayer’s home. Because Detroit has many older homes with lead water lines, it is expected to cost DWSD $25 million per year over many years. Brown estimated there were 125,000 units in the City that have lead lines. This would be an unfunded mandate that DWSD would have to pay.[58] These costs would be passed on to DWSD’s customers.

The DWSD should have been the best Department in the City. It was able to recoup its costs through its fees. It should have had the best staff, management, and equipment that money could buy. Unfortunately, it was poorly managed and staffed and was one of the worst Departments in the City prior to the bankruptcy and the citizens suffered with high costs and sewer back-ups. Corrupt businessmen and politicians took full advantage of the DWSD and ran it into the ground. Maybe it’s not a coincidence that the DWSD dysfunction occurred mainly under Federal oversight and not City oversight.

[1] Orr Kevyn, “Request for Information”, April 7, 2014

[2] Orr Kevyn, “Request for Information”, April 7, 2014

[3] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions, Compiled June 18, 2013

[4] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[5] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[6] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[7] Ferretti Christine, “Report: Half of pumps not working in Detroit rainstorms”, December 1, 2016, Detroit News

[8] Ferretti Christine, “Report: Half of pumps not working in Detroit rainstorms”, December 1, 2016, Detroit News

[9] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[10] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[11] Drumb Richard, My notes on CSO Meeting, January 14, 2016

[12] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[13] DWSD, “Analysis of Detroit Retail Water and Sewer Rates Proposed for FY 2016”, July 15, 2016

[14] Drumb Richard, My notes on CSO Meeting, January 14, 2016

[15] Drumb Richard, My notes on CSO Meeting, January 14, 2016

[16] Drumb Richard, My notes on CSO Meeting, January 14, 2016

[17] Drumb Richard, My notes on CSO Meeting, January 14, 2016

[18] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[19] Drumb Richard, “$5 million for Revere Land”, May 4, 2011, E-Mail to Richard Young, CAO

[20] Beckett Timothy, “City-DWSD Interfunds Update”, January 22, 2014, E-Mail From Timothy Beckett, Law Department

[21] Foster Renita, “Delinquent tax bill collections by Treasury”, July 18, 2012, E-Mail Gary Watkins, DWSD and Treasury

[22] Capobres Dave, “Outstanding A/R Balances”, March 14, 2012, E-Mail Shavi Sarna (E&Y)

[23] Woitulewicz Daniel, Accrual for DWSD Bills, July 30, 2014, E-mail

[24] Pokorski Jerry, “W & S analysis from outside, do you agree?”, February 27, 2013, E-Mail

[25] DWSD, “STATUS AND BUSINESS ISSUES -BOARD OF COMMISSIONER STUDY SESSION OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN”, February 11, 2014

[26] Pokorski Jerry, “W & S analysis from outside, do you agree?”, February 27, 2013, E-Mail

[27] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[28] DWSD, “STATUS AND BUSINESS ISSUES -BOARD OF COMMISSIONER STUDY SESSION OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN”, February 11, 2014

[29] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[30] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[31] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[32] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[33] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[34] DWSD, Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions Compiled June 18, 2013

[35] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[36] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[37] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[38] Orr Kevyn, “Request for Information”, April 7, 2014

[39] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[40] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[41] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[42] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[43] DWSD, “Detroit Water & Sewerage Department Synopsis of Federal Court Orders (Case 77‐71100)1 and Implications for Financial and Administrative Functions”, Compiled June 18, 2013

[44] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[45] GAO, Government Accountability Office, “WATER INFRASTRUCTURE Information on Selected Midsize and Large Cities with Declining Populations”, September 2016

[46] GAO, Government Accountability Office, “WATER INFRASTRUCTURE Information on Selected Midsize and Large Cities with Declining Populations”, September 2016

[47] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[48] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[49] Alexander John, “LPD Draft Report”, May 2019

[50] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[51] Capps Kriston, “Why City Fees Keep Rising Instead of Taxes”, June 4, 2015, Atlantic Citylab

[52] Haas, “WATER EQUITY AND SECURITY IN DETROIT’S WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT”, January 2019, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley, MOSES, and Praxia Partners

[53] GAO, Government Accountability Office, “WATER INFRASTRUCTURE Information on Selected Midsize and Large Cities with Declining Populations”, September 2016

[54] DWSD, “DWSD STATUS AND BUSINESS ISSUES -BOARD OF COMMISSIONER STUDY SESSION OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN”, February 11, 2014

[55] Drumb Richard, “Water rates question”, January 18, 2018, E-Mail to Thomas Stephens and David Whitaker, Director LPD

[56] Court, United States v City of Detroit, et al, United States District Court case №77-cv-71100-SFC

[57] Brown Gary, “Legislative Policy Division Request for Budget & Rate Information for FYs 19 & 20”, July 10, 2018, E-Mail to Council President Brenda Jones and City Council Members

[58] Drumb Richard, Notes from DWSD Meeting, February 16, 2018